Risk to the 2026 Election

American elections are hard to break. They run in more than 10,000 separate jurisdictions, nearly every vote is cast on paper, and every state audits its results. This page tracks the real pressures on the 2026 midterms, from Election Day on Nov. 3 through counting, certification and the seating of Congress on Jan. 3, 2027. It separates documented actions from online chatter. We won't play risks down, and we won't play them up. Read our analysis at America 2.0 →
This rating reflects pressure on the system, not a forecast that the election will fail. Federal officials have taken concrete steps aimed at how Americans vote and count, and courts have blocked most of them. No vote in a U.S. election has been shown to have been altered. About 99% of voters will cast a paper ballot or get a paper record, and every state audits its results. The points to watch are federal agents near polling places, counties refusing to certify, and the seating of the House on Jan. 3.
What would change this rating ↓
election2026.america2.newsSober analysis of threats to democracy, information warfare and the networks behind them. Free; unsubscribe anytime.
The risks below are real, but they come up against a system built with redundancy. To change an outcome, someone would have to defeat several of these safeguards at once, in many places, without being noticed.
Each risk people raise, rated by how far the evidence goes. A rating describes what's documented, not how worried to be.
Hard physical force: troops, armed agents, seizures, violenceSoft lawsuits, executive orders, pressure on officials, and shaping what people believe
1 material impact · 2 blocked · 5 action taken · 9 credible concern · 2 chatter
The FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force was disbanded in 2025. CISA has lost about a third of its staff, and federal funding for the election information-sharing center (EI-ISAC) ended (Nextgov). The Election Assistance Commission has had no commissioners since July 9, and for the first time since 2002 the State Department did not invite international OSCE observers. DHS released a 2026 election security plan on Sept. 24, and the Pentagon has directed the NSA and military cyber forces to guard election systems against foreign interference through the midterms (AP). Fewer public warnings mean that when officials say nothing, it tells us less than it used to. A classified threat briefing for state election officials on Oct. 15, the first in more than two years, was postponed when intelligence officials could not establish a secure connection; a U.S. official said it may be rescheduled next week (New York Times). ProPublica reported on Oct. 19 that, a few months into the administration, political appointees at DHS asked CISA to secretly acquire a voting machine, hack it and report the findings for the White House without alerting the vendor; career staff said it was impossible and the request was dropped, according to two former officials who were not named. State officials said CISA was absent from midterm planning until September, and some no longer share information with it after the White House published records states had given the agency about Election Day 2020. Officials in one large jurisdiction have met privately with vendors on a contingency plan in case federal authorities seize its machines or declare them unusable. The 2027 budget would cut CISA another $700 million (ProPublica).
Would move down: restored threat briefings and public attribution of foreign operations.
In an Aug. 24 letter, Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin wrote that the three largest vendors use some China-made parts. He cited their own 2020 testimony to Congress. The letter does not bar any machine. Its one concrete step was to tie full federal security grants to post-election hand counts of paper ballots, and a federal judge vacated that condition on Sept. 28. Claims that the machines are “disqualified” go beyond what the letter says. Election-security experts told PolitiFact there is no evidence that voting-machine vulnerabilities have ever been used to attack a real U.S. election (PBS/PolitiFact). In Georgia, the State Election Board voted 3–2 to urge a software update and seek federal technical help. Its executive director then asked DOJ and DHS to force machine changes, and the board's chair says the board never approved those letters. Allies are also pressing Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick to use a 2019 national-emergency order on foreign technology to ban machines or mandate hand counts. CNN reports that Commerce career staff reviewed the idea last year and took no action.
Would move up: an order barring specific machines for Nov. 3, a federal hand-count mandate that delays certification, or federal seizure of equipment.
Two executive orders tried to add proof-of-citizenship rules and restrict which mail ballots the Postal Service carries. Courts have blocked both, and on Sept. 14 the Supreme Court declined to let the mail rule take effect before November. On Oct. 3 the president posted a video urging Republicans to “vote early, vote by mail, or vote in person,” after years of calling mail voting fraudulent (CNN). In June the Court upheld state grace periods for ballots postmarked by Election Day. From Oct. 4 the Postal Service is extending branch hours, adding ballot-only postmark lines and expediting returned ballots (Reuters).
On Oct. 19 a federal judge declined to block North Carolina’s new absentee rules, adopted by the State Board of Elections on Sept. 4 in a party-line vote; ballots arriving in an unsealed inner envelope are no longer accepted, and voters must be sent new ones (NC Newsline). Gov. Josh Stein says rejections are running at twice the 2022 rate (WCTI).
North Carolina’s elections board has had a Republican majority since May 2025, when a new law moved appointments from the governor to the state auditor (AP). It mailed letters to more than 241,000 voters in February, and to about 180,000 in September, whose ID numbers did not match DMV or Social Security records (NCSBE). The board says the letters do not affect eligibility and these voters cast regular ballots (NCSBE). The risk comes after the vote: in 2024 a losing state Supreme Court candidate tried to throw out about 60,000 ballots over missing ID data (NPR).
Would move up: an appeals ruling that puts either order into effect before Nov. 3, or a post-election protest or lawsuit aimed at ballots from voters on North Carolina’s unvalidated-ID list.
The Justice Department has sued 30 states and D.C. for full voter files. Courts have dismissed 26 of those suits, and 16 states handed over their files (Brennan Center tracker). On Oct. 9 a federal judge vacated the department’s nationwide policy of collecting voter rolls, checking them against SAVE and pressing states to remove flagged voters, finding it exceeded the department’s authority (Reuters). An appeal is likely. The Supreme Court let DHS's overhauled citizenship-check database (SAVE) back into use. Federal prosecutors have also used grand jury subpoenas to obtain voter records from county offices, including at least five each in San Diego and Los Angeles counties. San Diego says it has not been told what is being investigated (inewsource). Internal records released in October show Homeland Security Investigations, part of ICE, ingested roughly 99 million voter-related records and weighed using undercover agents against voter-registration groups; several of its reviews found no wrongdoing (CNN). Armed Homeland Security Investigations agents have gone door to door in several states asking residents about citizenship and voting history; the Justice Department announced the arrests of more than 20 green-card holders in California, and Protect Democracy is suing over the campaign (CBS News). On Oct. 21 a federal judge ruled the practice likely violates the Voting Rights Act’s ban on intimidating people who help others vote. She ordered immigration authorities to halt elections-related field operations and interviews in nine states, including California and New York, where they are likely to involve people officials know or should suspect are citizens, until polls close on Election Day. The order is on hold until 5 p.m. Friday so the government can appeal (CBS News). On Oct. 20 Democratic groups led by the DCCC sued Trump, DOJ and DHS, arguing that threats of prosecution against election officials and demands to deny ballots based on federal lists violate the same section of the Voting Rights Act; the suit notes that 185 Nevada voters DHS said it had confirmed as noncitizens were all citizens, according to state records (Axios). On October 13 the department gave California 48 hours to review a list of people it “believes are likely noncitizens” who were sent mail ballots in Los Angeles County. It asked the state to withhold their ballots, set aside any that come back and not count those already returned “until citizenship has been determined,” or face a request for emergency relief in court (Reuters). On October 15, after the deadline passed, the department sued California and Los Angeles County's top election official, asking a federal court to bar them from counting mail ballots from “likely noncitizens” until citizenship is determined. It says federal immigration data flag more than 20,000 registrants but did not detail its method; Los Angeles County declined to open the encrypted drive over security concerns (Justice Department; Politico). Federal law bars systematic purges in the 90 days before an election. On October 16 the acting deputy attorney general warned Los Angeles County that officials who knowingly tabulate ballots from people federal agencies identify as noncitizens “risk becoming aiders and abettors to a federal crime.” Trump posted: “They will all go to jail for a long period of time!!!” (NBC News). On Oct. 19 the department charged 28 green-card holders in California, all from its list; several do not appear to have voted. It also asked a federal court to stop the state from processing ballots from people it calls “likely noncitizens” (NPR; NYT).
Would move up: mass removals or challenges of eligible voters close to Election Day.
The New York Times reports that U.S. intelligence assessed the Kremlin authorized a new influence campaign for the midterms, and that Iran and China are running AI-driven campaigns. On Oct. 21, Sen. Mark Warner and Rep. Jim Himes, the top Democrats on the intelligence committees, said a classified intelligence report shows Russia running a covert online campaign, using AI, against candidates of both parties who support Ukraine, with no sign of attempts to hack election systems (Politico; Reuters); the Republican House committee chair’s office called the disclosure “cherry-picked” (Politico). The analysis firm Graphika found that Storm-1516, a Russia-linked operation, posted deepfake videos on X falsely accusing Texas Senate candidate James Talarico of sexual assault (Politico). These are operations to shape opinion. None has been shown to change a vote. Independent researchers find that much of this content gets little real reach. On Oct. 14, X said it had suspended more than 13,000 accounts in three suspected foreign influence operations linked to Iran, Russia and China that targeted US political conversation (X). On Oct. 16 the Times reported that Russia’s Doppelgänger operation has used more than 50 fake personas on X, many posing as Israeli women, plus a network of over 1,000 accounts, to push about 150,000 posts since Oct. 7 claiming bipartisan support for Israel is collapsing; the threat-intelligence firm Alethea found the posts drew little engagement. Graphika tied September videos, apparently AI-made, that made baseless claims against Democrats in close Senate races to the Kremlin-linked operation known as Matryoshka, and says new campaigns targeted Sens. Cory Booker and John Hickenlooper with fabricated corruption reports (New York Times). The two men steering the main pro-Trump super PAC, James Blair and Chris LaCivita, were each paid “hundreds of thousands of dollars” to advise Milorad Dodik’s party, hired through a law firm retained by the government of Republika Srpska; Dodik met Vladimir Putin in a cordial meeting five days before Bosnia’s Oct. 4 election (Al Jazeera). President Trump said he would fire them if there was a conflict of interest, then said there was none because they are outside consultants (Al Jazeera). AI search answers are adding confusion: until a few weeks ago, Google’s AI answer on how to donate to Senate candidate James Talarico featured a link controlled by an unrelated PAC; its page carried Talarico’s name and photo but sent the money to Sen. John Hickenlooper’s campaign (The Atlantic).
Would move up: a verified intrusion into voter registration or results systems, or foreign state media and influence networks amplifying a claim that a US result is illegitimate.
Five weeks before the election, the White House began airing TV ads featuring the president and labelled “Paid for by the US Government.” One, shown during NFL broadcasts on Sept. 27, plays his “this is the final battle” speech and reuses footage from a 2024 campaign video (CNN). The White House calls them public service announcements. More than $10 million in public money had been spent by Oct. 6. After criticism from both parties, the president said his super PAC would pay for future ads, but the White House said it won't repay what was already spent, and a new government-funded ad began airing that day (New York Times). The Democratic National Committee sued on Oct. 7 to stop the spending, alleging that government-funded ads kept airing after the president's pledge (Politico). On Oct. 11 a federal judge in New York, ruling in a suit led by the watchdog group Common Cause, ordered the administration to cancel the rest of the $20 million ad buy and barred new taxpayer-funded ads for 14 days. The Justice Department had said the campaign would end that day anyway (court order; Politico). Critics say the ads may break the federal ban on spending public money on “publicity or propaganda.” Like other advertising, these ads aim at persuasion, not at how ballots are cast or counted. The FBI’s rapid-response account posted, then deleted, a video naming Democrats including Michigan Senate nominee Abdul El-Sayed as part of the “defund the police crowd”; the watchdog CREW filed a Hatch Act complaint (The Hill).
Would move up: government-funded ads resume despite the court order, a federal watchdog (GAO or the Office of Special Counsel) finds the ads unlawful, or the ads start urging a vote for or against candidates.
The documented claim about Elon Musk is money. As of Oct. 6 his America PAC had spent $26.7 million on 2026 races, $21 million of it in seven close Senate contests, mostly on ads, mail and texts attacking Democrats (WIRED, which tracks the PAC's federal filings daily). Musk's own giving is far larger: his representatives told The New York Times he has given more than $276 million since July, including $158 million to the Senate Leadership Fund and over $76 million to America PAC's canvassing program; filings due Oct. 15 should confirm the figures (NYT). Election officials in Colorado and Washington have also warned voters about misleading America PAC messages, including Colorado texts saying "Your ballot request is in," though every active voter there gets a mail ballot automatically (CNN). That spending is legal and public, and it aims at persuasion, not the count. It is also a small share of a cycle the ad tracker AdImpact expects to set a record of $11.6 billion in ad spending (AdImpact). Ads rarely change minds in general elections: a review of 49 field experiments put the average persuasive effect of campaign contact and advertising at about zero (American Political Science Review). In April 2025, Musk and groups he funds spent more than $20 million on Wisconsin's Supreme Court race, and his candidate lost by 10 points (PBS Wisconsin). Money can still matter at the margins of very close races, through turnout work and by setting the message. Musk’s platform is also a weak check on falsehoods: the watchdog NewsGuard found that X’s Community Notes failed to flag 93.1% of false midterm claims it identified, including at least four advanced by Musk himself (AFP). One gap: the Federal Election Commission has lacked a quorum since May 2025 and cannot open investigations or issue fines (CBS News).
Would move up: cash or prizes offered to voters or petition signers, as Musk's PAC did in 2024 and in Wisconsin in 2025.
On Oct. 12, Homeland Security Investigations agents searched the Washington home of Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.), who is on the Nov. 3 ballot, under a judicially authorized warrant. The Justice Department called it “part of an ongoing federal criminal investigation” and gave no details; no charges have been announced (AP). On Oct. 14 The Wall Street Journal reported, citing U.S. officials and others familiar with the probe, that the investigation is aimed at building a case to strip Omar of her citizenship and ultimately deport her, focusing in part on how she obtained citizenship and on her late father (WSJ). No charges or denaturalization case have been filed. Vice President Vance said in May that Omar “definitely committed immigration fraud,” offering no evidence; she calls the allegations lies (AP). Omar called the search “an attempt to target political enemies and weaponize federal law enforcement” (Fox News). Justice Department rules bar choosing the timing of any investigative step “for the purpose of affecting any election” and require consultation with its Public Integrity Section when an action could raise that concern (Justice Manual). Senior Justice Department leadership, including Acting Deputy Attorney General Trent McCotter, was consulted and approved the search, NPR reported, citing people familiar with it; it is not known whether the Public Integrity Section was consulted (NPR). The search came 22 days before Election Day. The department has long informally avoided overt steps against candidates in roughly the last 60 days before an election, and former U.S. Attorneys B. Todd Jones and Joyce Vance raised concerns about the timing (Star Tribune). The search fits a wider pattern: Reuters has counted at least 470 people and institutions targeted for retribution in Trump's second term (Reuters). A search does not change how votes are cast or counted. The risk is pressure on candidates and campaigns in the final weeks.
Would move up: searches, charges or arrests of other opposition candidates or campaign staff before Nov. 3, or action against election officials.
Asked about the Insurrection Act and a national emergency, President Trump said “I don't rule anything out or in.” The chairman of the Joint Chiefs has said there are no plans to put troops at polling places, and DHS says ICE is not planning operations aimed at them. The Justice Department is sending election monitors. A top official has said as many as 1,000 (Washington Post), the acting attorney general says they will go to every state, and the department says they will not be armed. Federal law (18 U.S.C. §592) makes it a crime to station troops or armed men at polling places. On Oct. 8, armed National Guard members already deployed in Washington were filmed standing beside a ballot drop box; Guard officials said they were not guarding it, and the D.C. Board of Elections asked the Guard to keep its members away from drop boxes and voting sites (Washington Post, DC News Now). In Florida, two Customs and Border Protection vehicles sat outside Leon County’s busiest early-voting site for 10 minutes on Oct. 19, and Monroe County’s elections supervisor is investigating reports of masked federal agents conducting a stop at a Key Largo polling place on Oct. 20; both supervisors contacted the FBI (CBS News Miami). Voting-rights groups are suing DHS over its policy on armed immigration officers. In Miami, police arrested a man accused of dressing as an ICE agent to scare voters at a polling site for Brazil's presidential election. That case did not involve a U.S. election, but it shows impersonation is a risk in its own right.
Would move up: any deployment order, or armed federal agents documented at polling places.
On Oct. 4 the president wrote that Detroit, Philadelphia and California “take weeks to Rig.” Counting does take time. Mail ballots are checked and tallied after polls close, and in many states they can't be processed early, so results move for days. That is how the system works, not evidence of fraud (WLRN fact check).
Would move up: official action to stop counts or to treat late-counted ballots as invalid, or a candidate declaring victory before counting ends, followed by early congratulations from allied governments, the “gray zone” play analysts at CSIS outlined for Hungary’s April election (CSIS).
At the Republican midterm convention on Sept. 9, the president promised a $5,000 “dividend” to every adult citizen “if the Republicans win the House… and the Senate” (TIME). He has since repeated that it depends on the result (Truth Social, Oct. 2). No bill, order or Treasury step exists. Paying it would take an act of Congress, and estimates put the cost above $1 trillion (USA Today). Legal experts disagree on whether tying it to the vote crosses into vote-buying; many say a public campaign promise is protected speech. Separately, federal $500 health-insurance refunds and $90 Medicare rebates are going out in the weeks before the election.
Would move up: a federal agency paying, or committing to pay, money that depends on which party wins.
The U.S. is at war with Iran. A joint federal advisory (AA26-097A) warns of Iranian attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure. We have found no confirmed Iranian intrusion into election systems.
Would move up: an official advisory naming election infrastructure as a target or victim.
The war has pushed gasoline to about $4.37 a gallon, up from $3.13 a year ago, and consumer confidence is at its lowest since 2014. On Oct. 9 the president said Putin had agreed to supply diesel and the Treasury licensed Russian diesel sales through April 2027, a move the Associated Press described as an attempt to address high fuel prices ahead of the midterms (NPR). On Sept. 26 the Coast Guard returned fire after shots from the Mexican side of the Rio Grande. Who fired has not been confirmed, and about 500 troops were sent to the area. We have found no evidence that either is being tied to the election. Both matter as possible triggers: economic anger can feed large protests, and a border or terror incident can feed emergency framing.
Would move up: an emergency declaration or domestic deployment justified by a border, cartel or war incident near the election.
Not every risk is an attack. In Texas, a vendor software error at the state's driver's-license agency left hundreds of thousands of voter registrations unsent to counties until September, and records show state agencies were warned of portal problems in March (Votebeat). In Oklahoma, the online registration portal failed on Oct. 9, the last day to register; Oklahoma Watch reporters confirmed the error, and the State Election Board did not respond to requests for comment (Oklahoma Watch). Voters who are not on the rolls can cast provisional ballots, which count once eligibility is confirmed. Breakdowns like this can cost people their vote, and they can be recast as evidence of fraud.
Would move up: large numbers of provisional or mail ballots rejected because of an administrative failure, or a failure used as grounds to delay certification.
Hoax bomb threats hit polling places in 2024 and 2025. Disruption was minimal, but more are expected. A third of local election officials report threats or harassment. CSIS finds election-related attacks are rare, with candidates and officials the most likely targets. This week, letters with a white powder were mailed to election offices in at least 15 states and to congressional offices, mostly those of Democratic senators but also at least two Republican senators (CBS News). The FBI is investigating “a series of suspicious mailings” nationwide, and preliminary tests found the powder not hazardous, according to law enforcement sources (NBC News).
Would move up: credible threats closing polling places, or an attack on election workers.
A September 2025 presidential memorandum, NSPM-7, directs federal agencies to investigate networks and funders behind “organized political violence.” This machinery is already in use. A Justice Department task force created under it, Joint Task Force Vanguard, indicted 15 members of a Minneapolis activist group in June. Eight people convicted over a July 2025 shooting at a Texas ICE detention center were sentenced to a combined 450 years, partly on terrorism charges. The State Department designated four European antifa groups as terrorists. None of these cases involves an election. Analyst Jonathan Winer argues this machinery could be turned on protests and organizers after a disputed election. We have not seen it used in an election context so far.
Would move up: terrorism investigations or charges tied to election protests or voting-rights groups.
Some county officials who refused to certify in past cycles are still in office. An Otero County, N.M., commissioner who voted no in 2022 told the Washington Post, “I would do it again if I felt strongly about it,” and a Washoe County, Nev., commissioner has voted against certifying every election since 2020 (Washington Post). On July 7 the Justice Department wrote to every state that any election officer who “knowingly retains noncitizens” on the rolls “could be subject to criminal liability” (Minnesota's copy). In January the FBI seized about 700 boxes of Fulton County, Ga.'s 2020 ballots and records under a search warrant (ABC News), and a federal judge let the government keep them. Tulsi Gabbard, then director of national intelligence, attended the Fulton search, and her office separately examined voting machines in Puerto Rico. Neither has produced public findings or charges; the Puerto Rico review found fixable flaws but no evidence of hacking or altered votes (Reuters). FBI Director Kash Patel promised arrests “coming soon” in the spring; none have come (The Atlantic). In Shasta County, Calif., the election chief padlocked ballots and called the FBI after losing his race. When officials overstep, courts have reined them in. California's Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the Riverside County sheriff's seizure of about 650,000 ballots was unlawful. In 2022, courts ordered Cochise County, Ariz., and Otero County, N.M., to certify. In most states certification is a mandatory duty (deadlines). Asked on Oct. 22 whether the Justice Department might try to block states from certifying results, Attorney General Todd Blanche said it is “not DOJ’s intention” to interfere and that he is not planning to, but declined to rule it out, citing hypothetical “doomsday” scenarios (CNN).
Would move up: a refusal or seizure that courts don't cure before a state deadline.
Congress sets Election Day by statute (2 U.S.C. §7). No emergency power lets a president move or cancel it (CRS).
We don’t consider it the most likely scenario, but security and legal professionals should keep in mind an outside possibility: a move made outside the law, not within it. In December 2022 Trump said a “massive fraud” should allow “the termination of all rules, regulations, and articles, even those found in the Constitution” (NPR). In February 2025 he posted, “He who saves his Country does not violate any Law” (AP). A sudden national-security crisis, such as an attack on US satellites, could be cited as grounds. Our Space War tracker has documented no hostile act. Legal experts told Reuters an emergency declaration would not give the president constitutional authority to take over elections, but an attempt could trigger “confusion, litigation and delays in certifying results.” Norm Eisen of the Democracy Defenders Fund: “My nightmare scenario is that voters are confused by everything that’s happening” (Reuters).
In a July 16 address, the president released declassified intelligence documents he said showed China had acquired 220 million U.S. voter files (Reuters). Experts told PBS that such voter data is commonly obtained and that holding it does not mean election systems were breached (fact check). Steve Bannon said “the predicate is being laid” and predicted a national emergency declaration on elections in the last week of August (Media Matters). None came. Asked on Sept. 28, the president said “I don't rule anything out or in” (USA Today). Presidents also keep pre-drafted emergency orders, called PEADs. They are classified and none has ever been made public (Brennan Center), so no one outside government can say what they contain. Even analyst Jonathan Winer, among the most concerned, writes that the administration “cannot lawfully cancel the midterms” (Washington Spectator).
Would move up: any order that sets aside an election statute or court ruling, citing an emergency.
Analysts Mark Medish and Joel McCleary warn that when the Clerk calls the roll on Jan. 3, seats whose certification is delayed or caught up in a federal “foreign interference review” could be left off, and in a close House that could decide the majority. Former federal appeals judge J. Michael Luttig lays out the same scenario: the Speaker replaces the Clerk, Kevin McCumber, with a loyalist who leaves Democrats-elect off the roll (The New Republic). We have found no named member of Congress describing such a plan. The House judges its members' elections (Art. I, §5), but the Clerk's role in the opening roll call is set by law, and courts have ruled that the House can't exclude a qualified member-elect. Legal scholars are split on how real the danger is (Lawfare; Protect Democracy).
Would move up: members or leadership publicly committing to block seating.
New reporting from major outlets and official sources, listed as it appears. Our monitoring adds headlines from major outlets automatically. "Checked" means our software fetched the full report and confirmed it supports its headline. "Reviewed" means an editor checked it against its source. "Auto" items have not been checked yet. Tap a label for our note. None of this is an endorsement. Our assessment is the rating above.
Claims we see shared most, from all sides, and what the record supports.
Not ruled out by the president. Officials say there are no plans, and federal law bars troops or armed men at polling places.
Described by Peter Ticktin, attorney for Tina Peters, on a Sept. 30 podcast: take control of ballots after machines count them and hand-count them before certification. Peters reportedly met Trump in the Oval Office on Oct. 5; the White House would not discuss it (Colorado Newsline). No order exists. On Oct. 16 Ticktin told Axios that authorities would probably need to commandeer ballots and election equipment to investigate; asked about calls for martial law, the White House did not answer directly, saying Trump “has done more than any other President to ensure we have free and fair elections” (Newsweek). The one federal ballot seizure on record was under a court warrant, for 2020 records in Fulton County (ABC News).
The letter says vendors use some China-made components and bars no machine. Its grant condition was vacated in court.
Viral posts since Oct. 19. The reports are real but isolated. Two Tennessee voters told WSMV a touchscreen kept picking the wrong candidate; the state says it has one such complaint out of about 400,000 ballots (WSMV). Singer Stella Parton said a Nashville machine kept defaulting to Sen. Marsha Blackburn until her third try; the state’s election coordinator told the Tennessean the system has multiple safeguards and urged voters to check the review screen and paper record (Tennessean). In South Carolina, a poll-book error showed about 150 early voters the wrong ballot style for an hour, a mix-up rather than a changed vote (ABC News 4). Touchscreen mis-taps are reported every election, in both directions (Texas Tribune, 2024). Check the review screen and your paper record before casting, and ask a poll worker if something looks wrong.
ProPublica reported that, a few months into the administration, DHS political appointees asked CISA to secretly buy a voting machine and test it for flaws for the White House. Career staff said it couldn’t be done and the request was dropped, according to two former officials who were not named. No machine was obtained or hacked, and the request came in 2025, not before this election (ProPublica). The device in the viral image is an ES&S ExpressPoll, a check-in tablet that does not record votes (ES&S).
In a July report, CISA said security testers took control of some county networks “within hours or days.” These were tests, not attacks, and the report does not say any votes changed (CISA report, via the White House). Texas now goes further than most states: since Sept. 1, voting systems there may not even be capable of connecting to a network (statute).
A risk scenario, not a reported plan. Former judge J. Michael Luttig lays it out in The New Republic; an advocacy group’s video presents it as a plan (Facebook). No member of Congress or document describes one. The scenario is still useful for monitoring and prevention: watch who serves as Clerk on Jan. 3 and whether certified winners are left off the roll (see the risk).
Speculation from commentators. No named member has described a plan, and courts have limited the House's power to exclude.
The CDC rates the risk of Ebola to the American public as low (CDC). In 2020, during a real pandemic, turnout was the highest of the century (Census). Turnout fell where officials cut access: Milwaukee went from 182 polling places to five in April 2020 (Brennan Center).
Election Day is set by federal statute. Only Congress can change it.
We found no credible report of a new order as of Oct. 6. The earlier order on mail ballots remains blocked, and the Supreme Court declined to let it take effect before November.
Viral posts since Oct. 20. What is documented: a small group of US national-security officials has been quietly advising states and lawmakers on how to prepare if the administration interferes in the election (Washington Post), and outside groups are preparing responses to scenarios ranging from ballot seizures to the Insurrection Act (The Hill). Planning to resist interference through courts, statements and protest is legal. No public evidence shows plans for violence, for harming the president, or for seizing power. Where the claim came from ↓
Foreign influence campaigns are real. Changing votes is another matter: there is no evidence it has ever happened, and paper ballots plus audits are the safeguard. After a classified briefing on Oct. 21, Rep. Jim Himes said, “Nothing out there suggests that there is even the capability or the intent to do interference” (Reuters).
Counting mail ballots takes days in many states by law. Fast counts elsewhere prove nothing about U.S. results (WLRN).
The phrase comes from October 2024 texts Musk sent Ashley St. Clair, shown in Alex Gibney's documentary Musk and authenticated by NPR. They describe no way of changing votes. Starlink's “lasers” link its satellites to each other for internet service. There is no evidence any vote count ran through it, and paper ballots plus audits would catch altered totals (PolitiFact). Musk's documented influence is his public spending (see “Big money,” above).
An intelligence-agency review of Puerto Rico's machines found fixable flaws but no evidence they were exploited or that votes were changed. A White House adviser's wider hunt found no evidence that foreign actors got into U.S. voting systems (Reuters).
The claim. Viral posts allege that Democrats, former national-security officials and allied activist groups are plotting a coup: if Democrats win in November, protests would provoke President Trump into invoking the Insurrection Act, and organizers would then declare the federal government illegitimate and shift power to Democratic governors. Supporters call it a “color revolution.” No public evidence shows plans for violence or a seizure of power.
Where it started. On Oct. 17 the account DataRepublican posted that the Insurrection Act would be “the trigger to pull off their coup” (X), then released a series over Oct. 18–21 built on recordings she says leaked from meetings of democracy-reform groups and former officials. Summaries of those meetings describe contingency planning for a possible legitimacy crisis, such as an options memo for governors; “coup” and “foot soldiers” are her reading. The Washington Post separately reported that US national-security officials have been quietly advising states on how to prepare for interference (Washington Post).
How it spread. Within hours the account CynicalPublius called it a “CIA-style color revolution” (X; 10,000 reposts). Sen. Mike Lee (X), Michael Flynn, who registered in 2025 as a consultant on Republika Srpska’s US lobbying contract at $100,000 a month (FARA), Glenn Beck, Lara Logan, Mike Benz (X) and former USAID official Pete Marocco amplified it; Elon Musk replied “Troubling” (X). By Oct. 21–22 it reached Dan Bongino’s outlet (X), Liz Wheeler (X), Frank Gaffney (X) and Promethean Action (X), the renamed LaRouche PAC (FEC). An X Space with DataRepublican and CynicalPublius is set for Thursday (X).
Where the frame comes from. “Color revolution” is the Kremlin’s term for Western-backed uprisings (CSIS), and US commentators applied it to Trump’s opponents in 2020 (Yahoo News). In our search we found no Russian state-media seed for this version; it began on US accounts.
Why it matters. A belief that opponents are plotting a coup can be used to justify treating legitimate post-election protest or legal challenges as sedition. Watch for officials adopting the claim. That is already happening: on Oct. 20 Michael Flynn posted “Find these traitors and arrest them,” tagging President Trump (X).
“Elevated” is a judgment about pressure on the system. It does not predict that the election will fail. Here is the reasoning, so you can weigh it yourself.
That the risk is higher. No single action has broken the system, but they are piling up in the final weeks: a federal search of a sitting opposition candidate's home (AP), immigration agents building a database of roughly 99 million voter-related records and reviewing voter-registration groups (CNN), Justice Department monitors bound for every state, taxpayer-funded campaign-style ads stopped only by a court (Politico), and a president who will not rule out the Insurrection Act (USA Today). Each has its own explanation. Together they put pressure on officials, candidates and voters that the formal rules do not capture.
That the risk is lower. Elections are run by thousands of local officials under state law. Courts have blocked or narrowed the key federal moves, and none reaches how ballots are cast or counted on Nov. 3. Republican officials in several states have pushed back. No vote has been changed, and certification held under far greater strain in 2020.
Many people are asking the same question: will this turn violent, or will the damage come through law, paperwork and propaganda? We sort the risks into two kinds. Hard means physical force: troops, armed agents, seizures, violence. Soft means lawsuits, executive orders, pressure on officials, and shaping what people believe about the results.
Our best sense. The main risk to this election is a bending of reality, not bloodshed. Nearly every documented action this year has been soft: lawsuits, orders, data demands and claims of fraud aimed at shaping what Americans believe about the results and laying groundwork to contest them. We expect that to intensify from now through Jan. 3.
Where it could turn hard. The hard risk is real, but it is narrower and comes later. This year's pattern is that physical force has been threatened, and sometimes used, against protests, not at polling places. So the most dangerous window is probably not Election Day. It is the weeks after, if a disputed count brings people into the streets and officials describe the protests as insurrection or terrorism. We also expect scattered incidents: threats, hoaxes, intimidation, and possibly isolated violence by individuals. We see no evidence of a plan for organized, large-scale violence around the vote, and the military's leadership is on record against putting troops at the polls.
What would change our read: an Insurrection Act invocation or deployment order tied to the election, armed federal personnel at polling places, terrorism charges brought against election protesters or organizers, or military leaders reversing their stated position.
America 2.0 doesn't make its own forecast. We do use forecasts as an input to the risk assessment, because the expected margin affects how hard a losing side may contest the result. Figures are attributed and as of the dates shown.
| Source | House (220 R – 215 D now; 218 for control) | Senate (53 R – 47 D now; Democrats need +4) |
|---|---|---|
| Cook | 208 seats at least lean D, 205 at least lean R, 22 toss-ups (Sept. 25) | 7 toss-ups: AK, IA, KS, ME, MI, OH, TX (Oct. 6) |
| Inside Elections | Democrats +7 to +15 seats (Oct. 1) | Democrats +3 to +5 (Oct. 1) |
| Sabato's Crystal Ball | 213 at least leans D, 202 at least leans R, 20 toss-ups (Sept. 29) | See current map |
| The Economist model | Democrats 94% | Democrats 59% |
| Betting markets (Polymarket, Kalshi) | Democrats ~91–93% | Democrats ~65% |
We move the rating only on credible, named sourcing, and only after editorial review.
Email us at editor@america2.news with the subject “2026 Election Security,” and include a link to where you saw it. We check each claim against credible sources. If it holds up, it goes on this page. If it doesn't, we'll say so.